A Dynamic Oligopoly Game of the US Airline Industry: Estimation and Policy Experiments by Aguirregabiria, Victor & Ho, Chun-Yu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Dynamic Oligopoly Game of the US
Airline Industry: Estimation and Policy
Experiments
Victor Aguirregabiria and Chun-Yu Ho
University of Toronto, Georgia Institute of Technology
9. August 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16739/
MPRA Paper No. 16739, posted 11. August 2009 05:42 UTC
A Dynamic Oligopoly Game of the US Airline Industry:
Estimation and Policy Experiments
Victor Aguirregabiria∗
University of Toronto
Chun-Yu Ho∗
Georgia Institute of Technology
First version: June 2005. This version: August 9, 2009
Abstract
This paper studies the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic factors to the adop-
tion of hub-and-spoke networks in the US airline industry. Our results are based on the
estimation of a dynamic oligopoly game of network competition that incorporates three
groups of factors that may explain hub-and-spoke networks: (1) travelers may value the
services associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the hub airport; (2) operating
costs and entry costs in a route may decline with the airline’s scale of operation in the ori-
gin and destination airports (e.g., economies of scale and scope); and (3) a hub-and-spoke
network may be an eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of other carriers. We estimate
the model using data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information
on quantities, prices, and entry and exit decisions for every airline company in the routes
between the 55 largest US cities. As methodological contributions, we propose and apply a
method to reduce the dimension of the state space in dynamic games, and a procedure to
deal with the problem of multiple equilibria when using a estimated model to make coun-
terfactual experiments. We find that the most important factor to explain the adoption of
hub-and-spoke networks is that the cost of entry in a route declines importantly with the
scale of operation of the airline in the airports of the route. For some of the larger carriers,
strategic entry deterrence is the second most important factor to explain hub-and-spoke
networks.
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1 Introduction
The market structure of the US airline industry has undergone important transformations since
the 1978 deregulation that removed restrictions on the routes that airlines could operate and on
the fares they could charge.1 Soon after deregulation, most airline companies decided to organize
their route maps using the structure of hub-and-spoke networks. In a hub-and-spoke route
network an airline concentrates most of its operations in one airport, called the "hub". All other
cities in the network (the "spokes") are connected to the hub by non-stop flights. Those customers
who travel between two spoke-cities should take a connecting flight at the hub. An important
feature of the hub-and-spoke system is that it fully connects n cities using the minimum number
of direct connections, n−1. Furthermore, within the class of connected networks with minimum
number of direct connections, it is the system that minimizes the number of stops.2 These features
imply that a connected hub-and-spoke system is the optimal network of a monopolist when there
are significant fixed costs associated with establishing direct connections, travellers dislike stops,
and cities are homogenous in demand and costs (i.e., Theorem 2 in Hendricks, Piccione and Tan,
1995). However, hub-and-spoke networks are not necessarily optimal in richer environments
with heterogeneous cities and oligopolistic competition. Other arguments have been proposed
to explain the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks. They can be classified in demand factors,
cost factors and strategic factors. According to demand-side explanations, some travelers value
diﬀerent services associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the hub airport, e.g.,
more convenient check-in and landing facilities, higher flight frequency.3 Cost-side explanations
claim that some costs depend on the airline’s scale of operation in an airport. For instance,
larger planes are typically cheaper to fly on a per-seat basis: airlines can exploit these economies
1Borenstein (1992), Morrison and Winston (1995), and Borenstein and Rose (2007) provide excellent overviews
of the US airline industry. For recent analyses of the eﬀect of the deregulation, see Alam and Sickles (2000),
Morrison and Winston (2000), Kahn (2001), and Färe, Grosskopf, and Sickles (2007).
2In a hub-and-spoke network, a traveller between city A and B should make no stops if either A or B is the
hub, and should make only one stop if both A and B are spoke cities. A "snake" or linear network can also (fully)
connect n cities using only n− 1 direct connections. However, in the snake network travellers should make more
than one stop when travelling between some cities.
3The willingness to pay for these services is partly oﬀset by the fact that consumers prefer non-stop flights to
stop-flights.
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of scale by seating in a single plane, flying to the hub city, passengers who have diﬀerent final
destinations. These economies of scale may be suﬃciently large to compensate for larger distance
travelled with the hub-and-spoke system. An airline’s fixed cost of operating in a route, as well
the fixed cost to start operating in a route by first time, may also decline with the airline’s scale
of operation in the airports of the route. For instance, some of these costs, such as maintenance
and labor costs, may be common across diﬀerent routes in the same airport (i.e., economies of
scope). Furthermore, some of these cost savings may not be only technological but they may
be linked to contractual arrangements between airports and airlines.4 A third hypothesis that
has been suggested to explain hub-and-spoke networks is that it can be an eﬀective strategy to
deter the entry of competitors. Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) formalize this argument in a
three-stage game of entry similar to the model in Judd (1985). The key argument is that, for a
hub-and-spoke airline, there is complementarity between profits at diﬀerent routes. If an airline
exits from a city-pair between a hub-city and a spoke-city, then it also stops operating any other
route that involves that spoke-city. Therefore, hub-and-spoke airlines are willing to operate some
routes even when profits in that single route are negative. This is known by potential entrants,
and therefore entry may be deterred.5
This paper develops an estimable dynamic game of airlines network competition that incor-
porates the demand, cost and strategic factors described above. We estimate this model and use
it to measure the contribution of each of these factors to explain hub-and-spoke networks. To
our knowledge, this is the first study that estimates a dynamic game of network competition.
In our model, airline companies decide, every quarter, in which markets (city-pairs) to operate,
and the fares for each route-product, they serve. The model is estimated using data from the
4Airports’ fees may include discounts to those airlines that operate many routes in the airport.
5Consider a hub airline who is a monopolist in the market-route between its hub-city and a spoke-city. A
non-hub carrier is considering to enter in this route. Suppose that this market-route is such that a monopolist
gets positive profits but under duopoly both firms suﬀer losses. For the hub carrier, conceding this market to the
new entrant implies that it will also stop operating in other connecting markets and, as a consequence of that,
its profits will fall. The hub operator’s optimal response to the opponent’s entry is to stay in the spoke market.
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of the potential entrant is not to enter. Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1999)
extend this model to endogenize the choice of hub versus non-hub carrier. See also Oum, Zhang, and Zhang
(1995) for a similar type of argument that can explain the choice of a hub-spoke network for strategic reasons.
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Airline Origin and Destination Survey with information on quantities, prices, and route entry
and exit decisions for every airline company in the routes between the 55 largest US cities (1,485
city-pairs). To test our hypotheses on the sources of hub-and-spoke networks, airline costs should
be measured at the route level. Though there is plenty of public information available on the
balance sheets and costs of airline companies, this is information is not at the airline-route level
or even at the airline-airport. Therefore, our approach to estimate the demand and cost para-
meters of the model is based on the principle of revealed preference. Under the assumption that
airlines maximize expected profits, an airline’s decision to operate or not in a route reveals infor-
mation on costs at the airline-route level. We exploit information on airlines entry-exit decisions
in city-pairs to estimate these costs.
This paper builds on and extends two important literatures in the Industrial Organization of
the airlines industry: the theoretical literature on airline network competition, especially the work
of Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995, 1997, and 1999); and the empirical literature on structural
models of competition in the airline industry, in particular the work of Berry (1990 and 1992),
Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009). We extend the static duopoly
game of network competition in Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1999) to a dynamic framework
with incomplete information, and N firms. Berry (1990) and Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (2006)
estimate structural models of demand and price competition with a diﬀerentiated product and
obtain estimates of the eﬀects of hubs on marginal costs and consumers’ demand. Berry (1992)
and Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) estimate static models of entry that provide measures of the
eﬀects of hubs on fixed operating costs. Our paper extends this previous literature in two
important aspects. First, our model is dynamic. A dynamic model is necessary to distinguish
between fixed costs and sunk entry costs, which have diﬀerent implications on market structure.
A dynamic game is also needed to study the hypothesis that a hub-and-spoke network is an
eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of non-hub competitors. Second, our model endogenizes
airline networks in the sense that airlines take into account how operating or not in a city-pair
has implications on its profits (current and future) at other related routes.
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The paper presents also two methodological contributions to the recent literature on the
econometrics of dynamic discrete games.6 First, we propose an method to reduce the dimension
of the state space in dynamic games. Our method extends to the context of dynamic games
previous approaches in Hendel and Nevo (2006) and Nevo and Rossi (2008). Second, we pro-
pose and implement an approach to deal with multiple equilibria when making counterfactual
experiments with the estimated model. Under the assumption that the equilibrium selection
mechanism (which is unknown to the researcher) is a smooth function of the structural parame-
ters, we show how to obtain an approximation to the counterfactual equilibrium. This method
is agnostic on the form of the equilibrium selection mechanism, and therefore it is more robust
than approaches which require stronger assumptions on equilibrium selection. An intuitive in-
terpretation of our method is that we select the counterfactual equilibrium which is "closer" (in
a Taylor-approximation sense) to the equilibrium estimated in the data. The data are used not
only to identify the equilibrium in the population but also to identify the equilibrium in the
counterfactual experiments.
Our empirical results show that the scale of operation of an airline in an airport (i.e., its
hub-size) has statistically significant eﬀects on travelers’ willingness to pay, and on marginal
(per-passenger) costs, fixed operating costs, and costs of starting a new route (i.e., route entry
costs). Nevertheless, the most substantial impact is on the cost of entry in a route. Descriptive
evidence shows that the diﬀerence between the probability that incumbent stays in a route
and the probability that a non-incumbent decides to enter in that route declines importantly
with the airline’s hub-size. In the structural model, this descriptive evidence translates into a
sizeable negative eﬀect of hub-size on sunk entry costs. Given the estimated model, we implement
counterfactual experiments to measure airlines’ propensities to use hub-and-spoke networks when
we eliminate each of the demand, cost and strategic factors in our model. These experiments
show that the hub-size eﬀect on entry costs is the most important factor to explain hub-and-
spoke networks. For some of the larger carriers, strategic entry deterrence is the second most
6See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007), and Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry
(2007) for recent contributions to this literature.
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important factor to explain hub-and-spoke networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 presents our model and assumptions,
and our approach to reduce the state space of the dynamic game. The data set and the con-
struction of our working sample are described in section 3. Section 4 discusses the estimation
procedure and presents the estimation results. Section 5 describes our procedure to implement
counterfactual experiments and our results from these experiments. We summarize and conclude
in section 6.
2 Model
2.1 Framework
The industry is configured by N airline companies and C cities or metropolitan areas. For the
moment, we consider that each city has only one airport, though we will relax this assumption.
Airlines and airports are exogenously given in our model.7 A market in this industry is a city-
pair. There are M ≡ C(C − 1)/2 markets or city-pairs. We index time by t, markets by m,
and airlines by i. The network of an airline consists of the set of city-pairs in which the airline
operates non-stop flights or direct connections. Our market definition is not directional, i.e., if an
airline operates flights from A to B, then it should operate flights from B to A. Let ximt ∈ {0, 1}
be a binary indicator of the event "airline i operates non-stop flights in city-pair m at period t",
and let xit ≡ {ximt : m = 1, 2, ...,M} be the network of airline i at period t. The whole industry
network is represented by the vector xt ≡ {xit : i = 1, 2, ..., N} ∈ X, with X ≡ {0, 1}NM . We
define a route as a directional round-trip between two cities, e.g., a round-trip from Chicago to
Los Angeles. The number of all possible routes is C(C − 1) = 2M , and we index routes by r.
A network describes implicitly all the routes for which an airline provides flights, either stop or
non-stop. L(xit) is the set with all routes associated with network xit.8
7However, the estimated model can be used to study the eﬀects of introducing new hypothetical airports or
airlines.
8For instance, consider an industry with C = 4 cities, say A, B, C, and D. The industry has 6 markets or
city-pairs that we represent as AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD. The number of possible routes is 12. If airline
i’s network is xit ≡ {xiABt, xiACt, xiADt,xiBCt, xiBDt, xiCDt} = {1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0}, then this airline is active in two
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Every period (quarter) t, airlines compete in prices taking as given the current industry
network xt, and exogenous shocks in demand and variable costs, that we represent using the
vector zt ∈ Z. An airline chooses the prices for all the routes in its route-set L(xit). Price
competition determines current profits for each airline and route. Section 2.2 presents the details
of our model of consumer demand, Nash-Bertrand price competition, and variable profits. Every
quarter, airlines also decide their networks for next period. There is time-to-build such that fixed
costs and the entry costs are paid at quarter t but entry-exit decisions are not eﬀective until
quarter t + 1. We represent this decision using the vector ait ≡ {aimt : m = 1, 2, ...,M}, where
aimt is a binary indicator for the decision "airline i will operate non-stop flights in city-pair m at
period t+1". It is clear that xi,t+1 = ait, but it is convenient to use diﬀerent letters to distinguish
state and decision variables. The airline’s total profit function is:
Πi (ait,xt, zt, εit) =
X
r∈L(xit)
Rir(xt, zt)−
MX
m=1
aimt Fimt (1)
where Rir(xt, zt) is the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium variable profit of airline i in route r, and Fimt
represents the sum of fixed costs and entry costs for airline i in market m and quarter t. Section
2.3 describes our assumptions on fixed costs and entry costs. We anticipate here two important
features. First, the term εit ≡ {εimt : m = 1, 2, ...,M} represents a vector of idiosyncratic
shocks in the fixed costs of airline i. These shocks are private information of this airline and are
independently and identically distributed over airlines and over time with CDF Gε. 9 Second,
fixed and entry costs depend on the airline’s scale of operation in the airports of the city-pair.
More specifically, we consider that fixed and entry costs may decline with an airline’s hub-size
in the city-pair, defined as the number of direct connections that the airline has in the two cities
that define the market. This cost structure implies that markets are interconnected through
markets, AB and AC, and it serves six routes, the non-stop routes AB, BA, AC, and CA, and the stop routes
BC and CB.
9There are two main reasons why we incorporate these private information shocks. As shown by Doraszelski
and Satterthwaite (2007), without private information shocks, this type of dynamic game may not have an
equilibrium. Doraszelski and Satterthwaite show that, under mild regularity conditions, the incorporation of
private information shocks implies that the game has at least one equilibrium. A second reason is that private
information state variables independently distributed across players are convenient econometric errors that can
explain part of the heterogeneity in players’ actions without generating endogeneity problems.
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hub-size eﬀects. Therefore, an airline’s entry-exit decision in a city-pair has implications on its
own profits and on other airlines’ profits at other city-pairs.
Airlines maximize intertemporal profits. They are forward-looking and take into account the
implications of their entry-exit decisions on future profits and on the expected future reaction of
competitors. Airlines also take into account network eﬀects (i.e., hub-size eﬀects) when making
their entry-exit decisions. We assume that airlines’ strategies depend only on payoﬀ-relevant state
variables, i.e., Markov perfect equilibrium assumption. An airline’s payoﬀ-relevant information
at quarter t is {xt, zt, εit}. Let σ ≡ {σi(xt, zt, εit) : i = 1, 2, ..., N} be a set of strategy functions,
one for each airline. A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in this game is a set of strategy
functions such that each airline’s strategy maximizes the value of the airline for each possible
state (xt, zt, εit) and taking as given other airlines’ strategies.
Let V σi (xt, zt, εit) represent the value function for airline i given that the other companies
behave according to their respective strategies in σ, and given that airline i uses his best re-
sponse/strategy. By the principle of optimality, this value function is implicitly defined as the
unique solution to the following Bellman equation:
V σi (xt, zt, εit) = max
ait
{ Πi (ait,xt, zt, εit) + β E [V σi (xt+1, zt+1, εit+1) | xt, zt,ait] } (2)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The set of strategies σ is a MPE if, for every airline i
and every state (xt, zt, εit), we have that:
σi(xt, zt, εit) = argmax
ait
{ Πi (ait,xt, zt, εit) + β E [V σi (xt+1, zt+1, εit+1) | xt, zt,ait] } (3)
That is, every airline strategy is its best response to the other airlines’ strategies. An equilibrium
in this dynamic game provides a description of the dynamics of prices, quantities, and airlines’
incumbent status for every route between the C cities of the industry.
2.2 Consumer demand and price competition
A product is a route, i.e., a directional round-trip between two cities. For each product/route (r),
there are two forms of product diﬀerentiation: the airline (i), and the indicator of non-stop flight
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(NS).10 For notational simplicity, we use k instead of the triple (i, r,NS) to index diﬀerentiated
products. Also, we omit the time subindex t for most of this subsection. LetHr be the number of
potential travelers in route r. Every quarter, travelers decide which product to purchase, if any.
The indirect utility of a consumer who purchases product k is Uk = bk − pk + vk, where pk is the
price of product k, bk is the "quality" or willingness to pay for product k of the average consumer
in the market, and vk is a consumer-specific component that captures consumer heterogeneity in
preferences. We use the index k = 0 to represent a traveler’s decision of not travelling by air, i.e.
the outside alternative. Quality and price of the outside alternative are normalized to zero.11
Product quality bk depends on exogenous characteristics of the airline and the route, and
on the endogenous scale of operation of the airline in the origin and destination airports. We
consider the following specification of product quality:
bk = α1 NSk + α2 HUBOk + α3 HUB
D
k + α4 DISTk + ξ
(1)
i + ξ
(2)
r + ξ
(3)
k (4)
α1 to α4 are parameters. NSk is a dummy variable for "non-stop flight". DISTk is the distance
between the origin and destination cities, and it is a proxy of the value of air transportation
relative to the outside alternative, i.e., air travelling may be a more attractive transportation
mode for longer distances. ξ(1)i is an airline fixed-eﬀect that captures between-airlines diﬀerences
in quality which are constant over time and across markets. ξ(2)r represents the interaction of
(origin and destination) city dummies and time dummies. These terms account for demand
shocks, such as seasonal eﬀects, which can vary across cities and over time. ξ(3)k is a demand
shock that is airline and route specific. The variables HUBOk and HUB
D
k are indexes that
represent the scale of operation or "hub size" of airline i in the origin and destination airports
of route r, respectively. These variables capture consumer willingness to pay for the services
associated with the scale of operation of an airline in the origin, destination and connecting
airports. Following previous studies, we measure hub-size of an airline in an airport as the sum
10We do not model explicitly other forms of product diﬀerentiation, such as flights frequency or service quality.
Consumers’ valuation of these other forms of product diﬀerentiation will be embedded in the airline fixed-eﬀects
and the airport fixed-eﬀects that we include in the demand estimation.
11Therefore, bk should be interpreted as willingness to pay relative to the value of the outside alternative.
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of the population in the cities that the airline serves from this airport (see Section 3 for more
details).
A consumer purchases product k if and only if the utility Uk is greater than the utilities
of any other choice alternative available for route r. This condition describes the unit demand
of an individual consumer. To obtain aggregate demand, qk, we have to integrate individual
demands over the idiosyncratic variables vk. The form of the aggregate demand depends on the
probability distribution of consumer heterogeneity. We consider a nested logit model with two
nests. The first nest represents the decision of which airline (or outside alternative) to patronize.
The second nest consists of the choice of stop versus non-stop flight. We have that vk = σ1
v(1)ir + σ2 v
(2)
k , where v
(1)
ir and v
(2)
k are independent Type I extreme value random variables, and
σ1 and σ2 are parameters that measure the dispersion of these variables, with σ1 ≥ σ2. Let sk
be the market share of product k in route r, i.e., sk ≡ qk/Hr. And let s∗k be the market share of
product k within the products of airline i in route r, i.e., s∗k ≡ sk/ (sir0 + sir1). A property of the
nested logit model is that the demand system can be represented using the following closed-form
demand equations:12
ln (sk)− ln (s0) =
bk − pk
σ1
+
µ
1− σ2
σ1
¶
ln (s∗k) (5)
where s0 is the share of the outside alternative, i.e., s0 ≡ 1−
PN
i=1(sir0 + sir1).
Travelers’ demand and airlines’ price competition in this model are static. The variable profit
of airline i in route r is Rir = (pir0 − cir0)qir0 + (pir1 − cir1)qir1, where ck is the marginal cost of
product k, that is constant with respect to the quantity sold. Our specification of the constant
marginal cost is similar to the one of product quality:
ck = δ1 NSk + δ2 HUBOk + δ3 HUB
D
k + δ4 DISTk + ω
(1)
i + ω
(2)
r + ω(3)k (6)
δ1 to δ4 are parameters. ω
(1)
i is an airline fixed-eﬀect that captures between-airlines diﬀerences
in marginal costs. ω(2)r captures time-variant, city-specific shocks in costs which are common
12The nested logit model implies the following relationships. Define ek ≡ Ik exp{(bk − pk)/σ1}, and Ik is
the indicator of the event "product k is available in route r". Then, sk = s∗k s¯ir; s
∗
k = ek/(eir0 + eir1); and
s¯ir = (eir0 + eir1)σ2/σ1 [1 +
PN
j=1(ejr0 + ejr1)
σ2/σ1 ]−1.
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for all the airlines. ω(3)k is a shock in the marginal cost that is airline, route and time specific.
Given quality indexes {bk} and marginal costs {ck}, airlines active in route r compete in prices
ala Nash-Bertrand. The Nash-Bertrand equilibrium is characterized by the system of price
equations:13 pk − ck = σ1(1 − s¯k)−1, where s¯k = (eir0 + eir1)σ2/σ1 [1 +
PN
j=1(ejr0 + ejr1)
σ2/σ1]−1,
ek ≡ Ik exp{(bk − pk)/σ2}, and Ik is the indicator of the event "product k is available in route
r", that depends on airlines’ current networks in xt. Equilibrium prices depend on the qualities
and marginal costs of all the airlines and products that are active in the same route.
2.3 Fixed costs and route entry costs
The sum of fixed costs and entry costs of airline i in market m at quarter t is:
Fimt = FCimt + εimt + (1− ximt) ECimt (7)
where FCimt + εimt and ECimt represent fixed costs and entry costs, respectively, of operating
non-stop flights in city-pair m. The fixed cost FCimt + εimt is paid only if the airline decides
to operate in city-pair m, i.e., if aimt = 1. The entry cost ECimt is paid only when the airline
is not active in market m at period t but it decides to operate in the market next period, i.e.,
if ximt = 0 and aimt = 1. The terms {FCimt} and {ECimt} are common knowledge for all
the airlines. However, the component εimt is private information of the airline. This private
information shock is assumed to be independently and identically distributed over firms and over
time. Our specification of the common knowledge components of fixed costs and entry costs is
similar to the one of marginal costs and consumers’ willingness to pay:
FCimt = γFC1 + γFC2 HUBimt + γFC3 DISTm + γFC4i + γFC5c
ECimt = ηEC1 + ηEC2 HUBimt + ηEC3 DISTm + ηEC4i + ηEC5c
(8)
γ0s and η0s are parameters. HUBimt represents the average hub-size of airline i in the airports
of city-pair m. γFC4i and ηEC4i are airline fixed-eﬀects. γFC5c and ηEC5c are city fixed-eﬀects.
13See page 251 in Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992).
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2.4 Reducing the dimensionality of the dynamic game
From a computational point of view, the solution and the estimation of the dynamic game of
network competition in sections 2.1 to 2.3 is extremely challenging. Solving the dynamic game
requires one to ’integrate’ value functions over the space of the state variables {xt, zt}. This space
has a huge number of possible states. Given the number of cities and airlines in our empirical
analysis,14 the number of possible values of the industry network xt is |X| = 2NM ' 1010,000,
that is intractable. To deal with this computational complexity, we introduce several simplifying
assumptions that reduce very significantly the dimension of the dynamic game and make its
solution and estimation manageable.
Suppose that every airline has M local managers, one for each market or city-pair. A local
manager decides whether to operate non-stop flights in his local-market, i.e., he chooses aimt.
Let Rimt be the variable profit that local manager (i,m) is concerned with, that is defined as
the sum of airline i’s variable profits over all the non-stop and one-stop routes that include
city-pair m as a segment.15 To illustrate this concept, consider as an example the variable
profit of the local manager of American Airlines in the city-pair Boston-Chicago. Remember
that we have defined a route as a directional round-trip between two cities. The set of routes
that contain Boston-Chicago as a segment are the following: non-stop Boston-Chicago (1 route);
non-stop Chicago-Boston (1 route); one-stop routes with origin at Boston, stop at Chicago, and
destination to any other city (C − 2 routes); one-stop routes with origin at Chicago, stop at
Boston, and destination to any other city (C − 2 routes); one-stop routes with origin at any
other city, stop at Chicago, and destination Boston (C − 2 routes); and one-stop routes with
origin at any other city, stop at Boston, and destination Chicago (C − 2 routes). Therefore,
the number of routes included in the variable profit of a local manager are 2 + 4(C − 2). Given
that the number of cities in our application is C = 55, the number of routes included in the
variable profit of a local-manager is 214. It is important to emphasize that an airline’s variable
14We consider N = 22 airlines, C = 55 cities, and M = 1, 485 city-pairs.
15For simplicity in our computation of Rimt, we consider only non-stop and one-stop routes. Routes with more
than one stop represent a very small fraction of tickets and total revenue in the dataset.
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profit in a route is the result of the Nash-Bertrand equilibrium described in section 2.2, and
it depends on the incumbent status of all the airlines for that route. Therefore, the variable
profit of a local-manager depends on the incumbent status, x, of every airline at many diﬀerent
city-pairs. For instance, if Southwest decides to enter in the local-market Madison-Chicago, this
decision has a negative eﬀect on the profit of the local manager of American Airlines at city-pair
Boston-Chicago. This is because AA will see reduced its profit from the routes Madison-Boston
and Boston-Madison with stop at Chicago.
ASSUMPTION NET-1: The local manager at market m chooses aimt ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the
expected and discounted value of the stream of local-market profits, Et(
P∞
s=1 β
sΠim,t+s), where
Πimt ≡ Rimt − aimt (FCimt + εimt + (1− ximt)ECimt).
ASSUMPTION NET-2: The shocks {εimt} are private information of local manager (i,m).
These shocks are unknown to the managers of airline i at markets other than m.
Assumptions NET-1 and NET-2 establish that an airline’s network decision is decentralized
at the city-pair level. It is important to note that, given our definition of the variable profits Rimt,
this decentralized decision-making can generate equilibria with the entry deterrence studied by
Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997). In particular, every local manager takes into account that
exit from his city-pair market eliminates profits from every route that includes this city-pair as a
segment. This complementarity between profits of diﬀerent routes may imply that a hub-spoke
network is an eﬀective strategy to deter the entry of competitors.
Assumptions NET-1 and NET-2 simplify the computation of players’ best responses. How-
ever, the state space of the decision problem of a local manager is still X×Z, and the dimension
of this state space is computationally intractable. To deal with this issue, we consider a Markov
Perfect Equilibrium where players’ strategy functions do not depend on the whole vector of vari-
ables {xt, zt}, but only on a subset of this vector. This approach is in a similar spirit as Hendel
and Nevo (2006) and Nevo and Rossi (2008). However, these previous papers consider single-
agent dynamic decision problems, and here we extend the approach to the context of dynamic
games. We assume that local managers, when calculating their best responses, do not use all the
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information in {xt, zt}. Instead, the strategy of a local-manager, say (i,m), depends on εimt and
on the vector of payoﬀ-relevant variables
wimt ≡
©
ximt, Rimt, HUBimt, nmt, HUBmt
ª
(9)
where nmt is the number of incumbent airlines in marketm at period t; HUBmt is the average hub-
size in market m at period t considering all the active airlines; and ximt, Rimt, and HUBimt have
been defined above. This assumption can be interpreted either in terms of players’ incomplete
information, or bounded rationality, or limited computational resources.
ASSUMPTION NET-3: For every local-manager (i,m), his strategy function is σim(wimt, εimt),
that is a function from W ×R into {0, 1}.
Let σ ≡ {σim(wimt, εimt) : i = 1, 2, ..., N ; m = 1, 2, ...,M} be a set of strategy functions, one
for each local-manager. And let P = {Pim(wimt) : i = 1, 2, ..., N ; m = 1, 2, ...,M ; wimt ∈W} be
the vector of conditional choice probabilities (CCPs) associated with σ, such that Pim(wimt) is
defined as:
Pim(wimt) ≡
Z
1{σim(wimt, εimt) = 1}dGε(εimt) (10)
where 1{.} is the indicator function. Pim(wimt) is the probability that local-manager (i,m)
operates in the market. GivenP, let fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt) be theMarkov transition probability
of the vector {wimt} induced by the vector of strategy functions P. This transition probability
depends on players’ strategies in P and therefore it is not a primitive of the model but an
equilibrium outcome. We describe the structure of this transition probability function at the end
of this subsection. For the moment, it is important to emphasize that this transition probability
is fully consistent with the equilibrium of the model. The best response of a local-manager is the
solution of a dynamic programming problem. Let V Pim(wimt) be the (integrated) value function of
the DP problem in the best response of player (i,m). This value function is the unique solution
to the Bellman equation V = ΓPim(V ), where ΓPim(.) is the following Bellman operator:
ΓPim(V )(wimt) ≡
Z
max
a∈{0,1}
½
Πimt(a)− a εimt + β
P
w0
V (w0) fw,Pim (w
0|a,wimt)
¾
dGε(εimt), (11)
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with Πimt(a) ≡ Rimt − a (FCimt + (1− ximt)ECimt). Then, given V Pim, the best response of a
local manager can be described as: {aimt = 1} if and only if:
Πimt(1)−Πimt(0)− εimt + β
P
w0
V Pim(w
0)
h
fw,Pim (w
0|1,wimt)− fw,Pim (w0|0,wimt)
i
> 0 (12)
The best response probability mapping, that we denote by Ψim(wimt;P), is just the best response
function integrated over the distribution of the private information shock εimt:
Ψim(wimt;P) ≡ Gε
µ
Πimt(1)−Πimt(0) + β
P
w0
V Pim(w
0)
h
fw,Pim (w
0|1,wimt)− fw,Pim (w0|0,wimt)
i¶
(13)
We can define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) in our dynamic game of network competition
as a vector P ∈ [0, 1]NM |W | that is a solution to the fixed point problem P = Ψ(P), where Ψ(P)
is the vector of best-response (probability) functions {Ψim(w;P)} for every player (i,m) and any
w ∈W .
Now, we describe the structure of the transition probability functions fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt).
The vector of variables wimt is a deterministic function of the state variables in the original
problem, {xt, zt}. More specifically: nmt ≡
PN
j=1 xjmt; HUBimt =
P
m0∈Cm ximt, where Cm is
the set of markets with a common city with market m; HUBmt = N−1
PN
j=1HUBjmt; and Rimt
is the sum of the Bertrand equilibrium variable profits from diﬀerent routes. We use the vector
function wim() to represent in a compact form this deterministic relationship between wimt and
(xt, zt), i.e., wimt = wim(xt, zt). Given the structure of the model,16 we have that the transition
probability Pr(wimt+1|at,xt, zt) is equal to
P
zt+1∈Z 1{wimt+1 = wim(at, zt+1)} pz(zt+1), where pz
is the PDF of zt. We denote this transition probability as gwim(wimt+1|at). Note that the functions
gwim are primitives of the model, i.e., they do not depend on players’ behavior. Also, note that
these probability functions are conditional on the vector at that includes all the players’ actions
at period t. When calculating future expected profits of alternative actions, a player cannot
integrate next period profits using the transition probability gwim(wimt+1|at) because he does
not know other players’ current actions at period t. Instead, he uses the transition probability
16In particular, given the deterministic transition ximt+1 = aimt, and the iid assumption on the demand and
cost shocks in zt.
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fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt). By definition, the relationship between fw,Pim and gwim is the following:
fw,Pim (wimt+1|aim,wimt) ≡
P
a−(im)
gwim(wimt+1|aim,a−(im)) QPim(a−(im)|wimt) (14)
where QPim(a−(im)|wimt) is the probability distribution of the actions of players other than (i,m)
from the point of view of player (i,m), who observes only wimt, and given players’ strate-
gies in P. Other players’ actions depend on other players’ w0s which are unknown for a lo-
cal manager. Therefore, the probability function QPim depends on the probability distribution
Pr(w−(im)t|wimt,P). That is,
QPim(a−(im)t|wimt) ≡
P
w−(im)t
" Q
(j,n)6=(i,m)
Pjn(ajnt|wjnt)
#
Pr(w−(im)t|wimt,P) (15)
By Bayes rule, we have that Pr(w−imt|wimt,P) = p∗(wimt,w−imt|P)/p∗im(wimt|P), where p∗(wt|P)
and p∗im(wimt|P) are the ergodic probability distributions of {wt} and {wimt}, respectively, in-
duced by the CCPs in P.
For given transition probabilities {fw,Pim }, the solution of the DP problems that define players’
best response probabilities is a relatively simple computational task. Each of these DP problems
has a state space with dimension |W | that in our application is equal to 3960 points. However,
computing exactly the transition probabilities {fw,Pim } is not trivial, and in fact it suﬀers of a curse
of dimensionality. In particular, the exact computation of the ergodic probability distribution
p∗(wt|P) requires one calculate the Markov transition probability of wt that lives in the space
Wall ×Wall, where the dimension of Wall is |W |NM . To deal with this computational problem,
we use Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the transition probability functions {fw,Pim }. Our
simulator is in the spirit of the random-grid approximation method proposed by Rust (1997).
We describe in detail this approximation method in the Appendix.
Since we use Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the transition probability functions fw,Pim ,
one might argue that we could also use simulation methods to approximate value functions and
choice probabilities that depend on the whole vector of state variables {xt, zt}, without the need
to impose assumption NET-3. However, given the huge space of {xt, zt}, Monte Carlo simulation
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alone, without the additional structure imposed by Assumption NET-3, provides very imprecise
approximations to the equilibrium of the dynamic game.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
3.1 Construction of the working sample
We use data from the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) collected by the Oﬃce of
Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. The DB1B survey is a 10% sample
of airline tickets from the large certified carriers in US. The frequency is quarterly. A record in
this survey represents a ticket. Each record or ticket contains information on the carrier, the
origin and destination airports, miles flown, the type of ticket (i.e., round-trip or one-way), the
total itinerary fare, and the number of coupons.17 The raw data set contains millions of tickets
for each quarter. For instance, the number of records in the fourth quarter of 2004 is 8,458,753.
To construct our working sample, we have used the DB1B dataset over the four quarters of
2004. We describe here the criteria to construct our working sample, as well as similarities and
diﬀerences with related studies which have used the DB1B database.
(a) Definition of a market and a product. From the point of view of entry-exit decisions, a
market is a non-directional city-pair. For the model of demand and price competition, a product
or route is a round-trip between two cities, an origin city and a destination city. These market
definitions are the same as in Berry (1992) and Berry, Carnall and Spiller (2006), among others.
Our definition of market is also similar to the one used by Borenstein (1989) or Ciliberto and
Tamer (2009) with the only diﬀerence that they consider airport-pairs instead of city-pairs. The
main reason why we consider city-pairs instead of airport-pairs is to allow for substitution in
the demand (and in the supply) of routes that involve airports located in the same city. In
the demand, we distinguish diﬀerentiated products within a product-route. In particular, we
distinguish non-stop and stop flights, and the diﬀerent airlines.
17This dataset does no contain information on ticket restrictions such as 7 or 14 days purchase in advance.
Another information that is not available is the day or week of the flight or the flight number.
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(b) Selection of markets. We start selecting the 75 largest US cities in 2004 based on population
estimates from the Bureau of Statistics.18 For each city, we consider all the airports which
are classified as primary airports by the Federal Aviation Administration. Some of the 75 cities
belong to the same metropolitan area and share the same airports. We group these cities. Finally,
we have 55 metropolitan areas (’cities’) and 63 airports. Table 1 presents the list of ’cities’ with
their airports and population.19 To measure market size, we use the total population in the cities
of the origin and destination airports. The number of possible city-pairs is M = (55 ∗ 54)/2 =
1, 485. Table 2 presents the top 20 city-pairs by annual number of round-trip non-stop passengers
in 2004 according to DB1B.
(c) Airlines. There may be more than one airline or carrier involved in a ticket. The DB1B
distinguishes three types of carriers: operating carrier, ticketing carrier, and reporting carrier.
The operating carrier is an airline whose aircraft and flight crew are used in air transportation.
The ticketing carrier is the airline that issued the air ticket. And the reporting carrier is the one
that submits the ticket information to the Oﬃce of Airline Information.20 For more than 70% of
the tickets in this database the three types of carriers are the same. For the construction of our
working sample, we use the reporting carrier to identify the airline and assume that this carrier
pays the cost of operating the flight and receives the revenue for providing this service.
According to DB1B, there are 31 carriers or airlines operating in our selected markets in 2004.
However, not all these airlines can be considered as independent because some of them belong
to the same corporation or have very exclusive code-sharing agreements.21 We take this into
account in our analysis. Table 3 presents our list of 22 airlines. The notes in the table explains
18The Population Estimates Program of the US Bureau of Statistics produces annually population estimates
based upon the last decennial census and up-to-date demographic information. We use the data from the category
“Cities and towns”.
19Our selection criterion is similar to Berry (1992) who selects the 50 largest cities, and uses city-pair as definition
of market. Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) select airport-pairs within the 150 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
Borenstein (1989) considers airport-pairs within the 200 largest airports.
20According to the directives of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (Number 224 of the Accounting and
Reporting Directives), the first operating carrier is responsible for submitting the applicable survey data as
reporting carrier.
21Code sharing is a practice where a flight operated by an airline is jointly marketed as a flight for one or more
other airlines.
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how some of these airlines are a combination of the original carriers. The table also reports the
number of passengers and of city-pairs in which each airline operates for our selected 55 cities.
Southwest is the company that flies more passengers (more than 25 million passengers) and that
serves more city-pairs with non-stop flights (373 out of a maximum of 1,485). American, United
and Delta follow in the ranking, in this order, but they serve significantly fewer city-pairs than
Southwest.
(d) Selection of tickets. We apply several selection filters on tickets in the DB1B database. We
eliminate all those tickets with some of the following characteristics: (1) one-way tickets, and
tickets which are neither one-way nor round-trip; (2) more than 6 coupons (a coupon is equivalent
to a segment or a boarding pass); (3) foreign carriers; and (4) tickets with fare credibility question
by the Department of Transportation.
(e) Definition of active carrier in a route-product. We consider that an airline is active in a
city-pair if during the quarter the airline has at least 20 passengers per week (260 per quarter)
in non-stop flights for that city-pair.
(f) Construction of quantity and price data. A ticket/record in the DB1B database may corre-
spond to more than one passenger. The DB1B-Ticket dataset reports the number of passengers
in a ticket. Our quantity measure qkt, with k ≡ (i, r,NS), is the number of passengers in the
DB1B survey at quarter t that corresponds to airline i, route r and non-stop flight indicator NS.
The DB1B-Ticket dataset reports the total itinerary fare. We construct the price variable pk
(measured in dollars-per-passenger) as the ratio between the sum of fares for those tickets that
belong to product k and the sum of passengers in the same group of tickets.
(g) Measure of hub size. For each airport and airline, we construct two measures of the scale of
operation, or hub-size, of the airline at the airport. The first measure of hub size is the number
of direct connections of the airline in the airport. This hub size measured is the one included
in the cost functions. The second measure of hub size follows Berry (1990) and Berry, Carnall
and Spiller (2006), and it is the sum of the population in the cities that the airline serves with
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nonstop flights from this airport. The reason to weigh routes by the population in the destination
city is that more populated cities are typically more valued by consumers and therefore this hub
measure takes into account this higher willingness to pay.
Our working dataset for the estimation of the entry-exit game is a balanced panel of 1,485
city-pairs, 22 airlines, and 3 quarters, which make 98, 010 observations. The dataset on prices
and quantities for the estimation of demand and variable costs is an unbalanced panel of 2,970
routes, 22 airlines, and 4 quarters, and the number of observations is 85, 497.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
A network xit is a pure hub-and-spoke system if there is a city, the hub city, that appears in all
the direct connections in xit. Though there are some airlines with pure hub-and-spoke networks
in out dataset, they are not so common. However, quasi hub-and-spoke networks are the most
common networks in the US airline industry. In order to study an airlines’ propensity to use
hub-and-spoke networks (both in the actual data and in our model), we use the following ratio.
Given an airline’s network, xit, we define the airline’s hub, hi, as the city that appears more
frequently in the direct connections of the network xit. And we define the airline’s hub-and-spoke
ratio (HSR) as the proportion of direct connections that include the airline’s hub:
HSRit =
PM
m=1 ximt 1 {city hi is in city-pair m}PM
m=1 ximt
(16)
where 1 {.} is the indicator function. A pure hub-and-spoke network has HSR equal to 1. In
the other extreme, a point-to-point network connecting C cities has a ratio equal to 2/C.
Table 4 presents, for each airline, the two airports with largest hub sizes (as measured by
number of direct connections), and the hub-and-spoke ratio as defined in equation (16). Several
interesting features appear in this table. Pure hub-and-spoke networks are very rare, and they
are only observed in small carriers.22 Southwest, the leader in number of passengers and active
markets, has a hub-and-spoke ratio (9.3%) that is significantly smaller than any other airline and
22The only carriers with pure hub-and-spoke networks are Sun Country at Minneapolis (11 connections), Ryan
at Atlanta (2 connections), and Allegiant at Las Vegas (3 connections).
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very close to a pure point-to-point network. Among the largest carriers, the ones with largest hub-
and-spoke ratios are Continental (36.6%), Delta (26.7%), and Northwest (25.6%). The largest
hubs in terms of number of connections are Delta at Atlanta (53 connections), Continental at
Houston (52), and American at Dallas (52).
Figure 1 presents the cumulative hub-and-spoke ratios for three large carriers: Southwest,
American, and Continental. Using these cumulative ratios we can describe an airline as a com-
bination of multiple hubs such that the cumulative ratio is equal to one. According to this,
Continental airlines can be described as the combination of 5 hub-and-spoke networks. However,
the description of American as a combination of hub-and-spoke networks requires 10 hubs, and
for Southwest we need 20 hubs.
Table 5 presents diﬀerent statistics that describe market structure and its dynamics. The
first panel of this table (panel 5.1) presents the distribution of the 1,485 city-pairs by the number
of incumbent airlines. More than one-third of the city-pairs have no incumbents, i.e., there are
not direct flights between the cities. Typically, these are pairs of relative smaller cities which
are far away of each other (e.g., Tulsa, OK, and Ontario, CA). Almost one-third of the markets
are monopolies, and approximately 17% are duopolies. The average number of incumbents per
market is only 1.4. Therefore, these markets are highly concentrated. This is also illustrated by
the value of the Herfindahl index in panel 5.2. Panel 5.3 presents the number of monopoly markets
for each of the most important carriers. Southwest, with approximately 150 markets, accounts
for a large portion of monopoly markets, followed by Northwest and Delta with approximately
65 and 60 monopoly markets, respectively. Panels 5.4 and 5.5 present the distribution of markets
by the number of new entrants and by the number of exits, respectively. It is interesting that,
even for our quarterly frequency of observation, there is a substantial amount of entry and exit in
these markets. The average number of entrants per market and quarter is 0.17 and the average
number of exits is 0.12. As shown in section 4, this significant turnover provides information to
identify fixed costs and entry costs parameters with enough precision.
Table 6 presents the transition matrix for the number of incumbent airlines in a city-pair.
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We report the transition matrix from the second to the third quarter of 2004.23 There is signifi-
cant persistence in market structure, specially in markets with zero incumbents or in monopoly
markets. Nevertheless, there is a non-negligible amount of transition dynamics.
4 Estimation of the structural model
Our approach to estimate the structural model proceeds in three steps. First, we estimate the
parameters in the demand system using information on prices, quantities and product charac-
teristics. In a second step, we estimate the parameters in the marginal cost function using the
Nash-Bertrand equilibrium conditions. Steps 1 and 2 provide estimates of the eﬀects of hub-
size on demand and variable costs. Given these estimates of variable profits, we estimate the
parameters in fixed costs and entry costs using the dynamic game of network competition.
4.1 Estimation of the demand system
The demand model can be represented using the regression equation:
ln (skt)− ln (s0t) = Wkt α+
µ
−1
σ1
¶
pkt +
µ
1− σ2
σ1
¶
ln (s∗kt) + ξ
(3)
kt (17)
The regressors in vectorWkt are the ones in equation (4): i.e., dummy for nonstop-flight, hub-size
variables, distance, airline dummies, origin-city dummies × time dummies, and destination-city
dummies × time dummies.
It is well-known that an important econometric issue in the estimation of this demand system
is the endogeneity of prices and conditional market shares ln (s∗kt) (see Berry, 1994, and Berry,
Levinshon and Pakes, 1995). Equilibrium prices depend on the characteristics (observable and
unobservable) of all products, and therefore the regressor pkt is correlated with the unobservable
demand shock ξ(3)kt . Similarly, the regressor ln (s
∗
kt) depends on unobserved characteristics and it
is endogenous. In our model, there is other potential endogeneity problem in the estimation of
the demand. The hub-size variables HUBOkt and HUB
D
kt (included in the vector Wkt) depend on
the entry decisions of the airline in other city-pairs that include the origin or the destination cities
23The transition matrices from Q1 to Q2 and from Q3 to Q4 are very similar to the one reported in Table 6.
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of the route in product k. These entry decisions may be correlated with the demand shock ξ(3)kt .
For instance, if the demand shocks ξ(3)kt are spatially correlated across markets, entry decisions in
other nearby markets depend on {ξ(3)kt }, and therefore the hub-size variables are endogenous in
the estimation of the demand model. The following assumption, together with the time-to-build
assumption on entry-exit decisions, implies that the hub-size variables are not endogenous in the
estimation of demand.24
ASSUMPTION D1: Idiosyncratic demand shocks {ξ(3)kt } are not serially correlated over time.
Assumption D1 establishes that once we control for the observable variables in Wkt, including
airline fixed eﬀects ξ(1)i , and airport-time eﬀects ξ
(2)
kt , the residual demand does not present any
persistence or time-series correlation. Given that entry-exit decisions are taken a quarter before
they become eﬀective, if demand shocks {ξ(3)kt } are not serially correlated, then they are not
correlated with hub-size variables.
ASSUMPTION D2: The idiosyncratic demand shock {ξ(3)kt } is private information of the corre-
sponding airline. Furthermore, the demand shocks of two diﬀerent airlines at two diﬀerent routes
are independently distributed.
Remember that the hub-size variables HUBOkt and HUB
D
kt depend on the entry decisions in city-
pairs that include one of the cities in the origin or the destination of the route in product k, but
they exclude the own city-pair of product k. Under Assumption D2, the hub-size variables of
other airlines in the same route are not correlated with ξ(3)kt . Furthermore, by the equilibrium
condition, prices depend on the hub-size of every active firm in the market. Therefore, we can
use the hub-sizes of competing airlines as valid instruments for the price pkt and the market share
ln (s∗kt). We use as instruments the average value of the hub-sizes of the competitors. Note that
Assumptions D1 and D2 are testable. Using the residuals from the estimation we can test for
time-series correlation, and cross-airlines correlation in the idiosyncratic demand shocks ξ(3)kt .
Table 7 presents our estimates of the demand system. To illustrate the endogeneity problem,
24Sweeting (2007) considers a similar identifying assumption in the estimation of a demand system of radio
listeners in the context of a dynamic oligopoly model of the commercial radio industry.
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we report both OLS and IV estimation results. The estimated coeﬃcient for the FARE variable
in the IV estimation is significantly smaller than in the OLS estimation, which is consistent
with the endogeneity of prices in the OLS estimation. The test of first order serial correlation
in the residuals cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. This result supports
Assumption D1, and therefore the exogeneity of the hub-size variables.
We can obtain measures of willingness to pay for diﬀerent product characteristics, in dollar
amounts, by dividing the coeﬃcient of the product characteristic by the coeﬃcient of the FARE
variable. We find that the willingness to pay for a non-stop flight is $152 more than for a stop-
flight. The estimated eﬀects of hub-size are also plausible. Expanding the hub-size in the origin
airport (destination airport) in one million people would increase consumers willingness to pay
in $1.97 ($2.63). Finally, longer nonstop distance makes consumer more inclined to use airplane
transportation than other transportation modes.
4.2 Estimation of variable costs
Given the Nash-Bertrand price equations and our estimates of demand parameters, we can obtain
estimates of marginal costs as cˆkt = pkt − σˆ1(1 − s¯kt)−1, where σˆ1(1 − s¯kt)−1 is the estimated
price-cost margin of product k at period t. The marginal cost function can be represented using
the regression equation cˆkt = Wkt δ + ω
(3)
kt , where the vector of regressors Wkt has the same
definition as in the demand equation above.
As in the estimation of demand, the hub-size variables are potentially endogenous regressors
in the estimation of the marginal cost function. These variables might be correlated with the
cost shock ω(3)kt . We consider the following identifying assumption.
ASSUMPTION MC1: Idiosyncratic shocks in marginal cost {ω(3)kt } are not serially correlated
over time.
Assumption MC1 implies that the hub-size variables are exogenous regressors in the marginal
cost function. Under this assumption, the vector of parameters δ can be estimated consistently
by OLS.
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Table 8 presents OLS estimates of the marginal cost function. The marginal cost of a non-stop
flight is $12 larger than the marginal cost of a stop-flight, but this diﬀerence is not statistically
significant. Distance has a significantly positive eﬀect on marginal cost. The airline scale of
operation (or hub-size) at the origin and destination airports reduce marginal costs. However,
these eﬀects are relatively small. An increase of one million people in the hub-size of the origin
airport (destination airport) would reduce the marginal cost (per passenger) in $2.3 ($1.6).
4.3 Estimation of the dynamic game
4.3.1 An alternative representation of the equilibrium mapping
As shown in section 2.4, a MPE of our dynamic game can be described as a vectorP of conditional
choice probabilities (CCPs) that solves the equilibrium fixed point problem P = Ψ(P), where Ψ
is the best response probability mapping that we have defined in equation (13). Following the
Representation Lemma in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007, page 11), we can represent a MPE
of our dynamic game as a fixed point of an alternative mapping that is more convenient for
estimation. In order to describe this representation, it is useful to write the current profit of a
local manager, Πimt, as follows:
Πimt = (1− aimt) zimt(0) θ + aimt zimt(1) θ − aimt εimt (18)
θ is a column vector with the structural parameters characterizing fixed and entry costs:
θ ≡
¡
1, γFC1 , γFC2 , γFC3 , {γFC4i }, {γFC5c }
ηEC1 , ηEC2 , ηEC3 , {ηEC4i }, {ηEC5c }
¢0 (19)
where {γFC4i } and {ηEC4i } represent airline fixed-eﬀects in fixed costs and entry costs, respectively,
and {γFC5c } and {γEC5c } represent city fixed-eﬀects. zimt(0) and zimt(1) are row vectors with the
following definitions:
zimt(0) ≡ ( Rimt, 0 )
zimt(1) ≡
¡
Rimt, 1, HUBimt, DISTm, AIRDUMi, CITY DUMm
(1− ximt) ∗
£
1, HUBimt, DISTm, AIRDUMi, CITY DUMm
¤¢ (20)
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AIRDUMi and CITY DUMm are vectors of airline dummies and city dummies, respectively.25
We can represent a MPE in this model as a vectorP = {Pim(w)} of CCPs that solves the fixed
point problem P = Λ(θ,P), where Λ(θ,P) ≡ {Λ(z˜Pimt
θ
σε
+ e˜Pimt) : for every (i,m,wimt)}. Λ() is
the CDF of εimt/σε, that in our model is the logistic function exp(.)/(1+exp(.)). The vector z˜Pimt
is equal to z˜Pimt(1)− z˜Pimt(0), where z˜Pimt(a) represents the expected and discounted sum of current
and future z vectors {zimt+j(aimt+j) : j = 0, 1, 2, ...} which may occur along all possible histories
originating from the choice of aimt = a in state wimt, if player (i,m) behaves optimally in the
future and the other players behave, now and in the future, according to their choice probabilities
in P. Similarly, e˜Pimt is equal to e˜Pimt(1)− e˜Pimt(0), where e˜Pimt(a) has the same definition as z˜Pimt(a)
but for the expected and discounted sum of the stream {aimt+j εimt/σε : j = 1, 2, ...} instead of
zimt+j(aimt+j). More formally,
z˜Pimt(a) = zimt(a) + β
X
wimt+1
fw,Pim (wimt+1|a,wimt) V Pz,im(wimt+1)
e˜Pimt(a) = β
X
wimt+1
fw,Pim (wimt+1|a,wimt) V Pe,im(wimt+1)
(21)
The matrix of valuations VPz,im ≡ {V Pz,im(wim) : wim ∈ W} is equal to (I − βFw,Pim )−1((1 −
Pim)∗Zim(0)+Pim ∗Zim(1)), where Pim is the column vector of choice probabilities {Pim(wim) :
wim ∈W}; Zim(a) is the matrix {zimt(a) : wimt ∈W}; and Fw,Pim is aW×W matrix of transition
probabilities with elements (1−Pim(wimt))fw,Pim (wimt+1|0,wimt)+Pim(wimt)fw,Pim (wimt+1|1,wimt).
Similarly, the vector of valuationsVPe,im ≡ {V Pe,im(wim) : wim ∈ X} is equal to (I−βFw,Pim )−1Pim∗
eim, where eim is a aW ×1 with elements E(εimt/σε|wimt, aimt = 1 is the optimal choice). Given
that εimt has a logistic distribution, the elements of eim are equal to Euler− lnPim(wim), where
Euler represents Euler’s constant.
For a fixed value of P, the evaluation of the mapping Λ(θ,P) for multiple values of θ is
very simple computationally because the values {z˜Pimt} and {e˜Pimt} are fixed and they should not
be recomputed. However, the evaluation of the mapping Λ(θ,P) for multiple values of P is
25AIRDUMi is a vector of dimension N − 1 = 21 with a 1 at the position of airline i and zeroes elsewhere.
Similarly, CITY DUMm is a vector of dimension C − 1 = 54 with 10s at the positions of the two cities in market
m and zeroes elsewhere.
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significantly more costly because the values {z˜Pimt} and {e˜Pimt} should be recalculated. The most
costly tasks in recalculating these values are the computation of the transition probabilities fw,Pim
and of the inverse matrices (I − βFw,Pim )−1. Note that we have to calculate these functions and
matrices for every local manager (i,m), and there are 22 ∗ 1, 485 = 32, 670 local managers.26
For the computation of the values z˜Pimt and e˜Pimt we discretize the vector of state variables
wimt = (ximt, Rimt, HUBimt, nmt, HUBmt). The incumbent status ximt is already a binary
variable. The number of incumbents, nmt, is discretized in 5 values: {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} where nmt = 4
represents four or more incumbents. Figures 2 and 3 present the empirical distributions of the
variables ln(Rimt) andHUBimt, respectively. We discretizeHUBimt andHUBmt using a uniform
grid of 6 points in the interval [0, 54]. Similarly, we discretize ln(Rimt) using a uniform grid of
11 points in the interval [4, 18]. These discretizations imply that the state space of wimt, W , has
2 ∗ 11 ∗ 6 ∗ 5 ∗ 6 = 3, 960 cells.
4.3.2 Estimators
For notational simplicity, we use θ to represent θ/σε. For arbitrary values of θ and P, define
the likelihood function:
Q(θ,P) ≡
MX
m=1
TX
t=1
NX
i=1
aimt lnΛ
¡
z˜Pimtθ+e˜Pimt
¢
+ (1− aimt) lnΛ
¡
−z˜Pimtθ−e˜Pimt
¢
(22)
For given P, this is the log-likelihood function of a standard logit model where the parameter of
one of the explanatory variables (i.e., the parameter associated to e˜Pimt) is restricted to be one.
Let θ0 be the true value of the θ in the population, and let P0 be the true equilibrium
in the population. The vector P0 is an equilibrium associated with θ0: i.e., in vector form,
P0 = Λ
¡
z˜P0θ + e˜P0
¢
. A two-step estimator of θ is defined as a pair (θˆ, Pˆ) such that Pˆ is
a nonparametric consistent estimator of P0 and θˆ maximizes the pseudo likelihood Q(θ, Pˆ).
The main advantage of this estimator is its simplicity. Given Pˆ and the constructed variables
z˜Pˆimt and e˜Pˆimt, the vector of parameters θ0 is estimated using a standard logit model. However,
26However, we do not need to keep the probabilities fw,Pim and Pim, and the matrix (I − βF
w,P
im )
−1 in memory
once we have calculated z˜Pimt and e˜
P
imt for a local manager. Therefore, the memory requirements of this method
are only of the order of magnitude of our sample size.
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this two-step method suﬀers of several important limitations. First, the method should be
initialized with a consistent estimator of P0. That consistent estimator may not be available
in models with unobserved heterogeneity. Our model includes airline and city heterogeneity
in fixed costs and entry costs. Conditional on (i,m) we have only T = 4 observations, and
therefore it is not plausible to argue that we have a consistent nonparametric estimator of P0.
However, note that given a consistent estimator of P0, the logit estimator of θ0 in the second
step is consistent despite the existence of unobserved airline and city heterogeneity. This logit
estimator captures this heterogeneity by including airline dummies (22) and city dummies (55),
but not city-pair dummies (i.e., we would have to include 1, 485 dummies). Without a parametric
assumption that establishes how the city dummies enter into the model, we have that including
city dummies is equivalent to include city-pair dummies. Therefore, the nonparametric estimator
is not consistent. The second important limitation of the two-step method is that, even when
consistent, the initial estimator Pˆ typically suﬀers of the well-known curse of dimensionality in
nonparametric estimation. When the number of conditioning variables is relatively large, the
estimator Pˆ can be seriously biased and imprecise in small samples. In a nonlinear model, both
the bias and the variance of Pˆ can generate serious biases in the second step estimator of θ0.
Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) proposed an alternative estimator that deals with the limi-
tations of the two-step method. The Nested Pseudo Likelihood (NPL) estimator is defined as a
pair (θˆ, Pˆ) that satisfies the following two conditions:
θˆ = argmax
θ∈Θ
Q(θ, Pˆ)
Pˆ = Λ
³
z˜Pˆθˆ + e˜Pˆ
´ (23)
That is, θˆ maximizes the pseudo likelihood given Pˆ (as in the two-step estimator), and Pˆ is an
equilibrium associated with θˆ. The transition probabilities fw,Pˆim , that we use to calculate z˜Pˆ and
e˜Pˆ, are equilibrium transition probabilities. This estimator has lower asymptotic variance and
finite sample bias than the two-step estimator (see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007, and Kasahara
and Shimotsu, 2008).
A recursive extension of the two-step method can be used as a simple algorithm to obtain
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the NPL estimator. We initialize the procedure with an initial vector of CCPs, say Pˆ0. Note
that Pˆ0 is not necessarily a consistent estimator of P0. Then, at iteration K ≥ 1, we update our
estimates of (θ0,P0) by using the pseudo maximum likelihood (logit) estimator θˆ
K
= argmaxθ∈Θ
Q(θ, PˆK−1) and the policy iteration PˆK = Λ
³
z˜Pˆ
K−1θˆK + e˜PˆK−1
´
, that is:
PˆKim(wimt) = Λ
³
z˜Pˆ
K−1
imt θˆ
K
+ e˜Pˆ
K−1
imt
´
(24)
Upon convergence, this algorithm provides the NPL estimator. Maximization of the pseudo
likelihood function with respect to θ is extremely simple because Q(θ,P) is globally concave in
θ for any possible value of P.
In our application, we initialize the procedure with a reduced-form estimation of the CCPs
Pim(w∗imt) based on a logit model that includes as explanatory variables airline dummies, city
dummies, and a second order polynomial in w∗imt.
4.3.3 Estimation results
Table 9 presents our estimation results for the dynamic game of network competition. We have
fixed a value of the quarterly discount factor, β, equal to 0.99 (i.e, a 0.96 annual discount factor).
The estimates are measured in thousands of dollars. The estimated fixed cost, evaluated at the
mean value of hub-size, distance, and airline and city dummies, is $119, 000. The sample median
of the quarterly variable profit in the non-stop routes of a city-pair is around $159,000. Thus,
the mean value of the estimated fixed cost is 75% of that median variable profit. Perhaps not
surprisingly for this industry, this value implies very substantial economies of scale. Fixed costs
increase with the distance between the two cities: it increases $4.64 per mile. Hub-size has also
a significant eﬀect on fixed costs. A unit increase in hub-size (i.e., an additional city connected)
implies a $1, 020 reduction in fixed costs. This seems a non-negligible cost reduction.
The estimated entry cost, evaluated at the mean value of hub-size and distance, is $298, 000.
This value represents 250% of the corresponding (quarterly) fixed cost, 187% of the median
variable profit, and 7.5 times the (quarterly) operating profit (variable profit minus fixed cost)
in a market with median variable profit, mean distance and mean hub-size. That is, it requires
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almost two years of profits to compensate the firm for its initial investment or entry cost. These
costs do not depend significantly on flown distance. However, the eﬀect of hub-size is very
important. While an airline with the minimum hub-size (i.e., zero) has to pay an entry cost of
$536, 000, an airline with the maximum hub-size in the sample (i.e., 50 cities connected) pays
only $73, 000. A unit increase in hub-size implies a reduction of entry costs of more than $9, 260.
We have included airline fixed-eﬀects and city fixed eﬀects in all our estimations. Therefore,
the eﬀects that we have estimated cannot be spuriously capturing unobserved airline charac-
teristics invariant across markets and over time, or unobserved city characteristics (e.g., better
infrastructure and labor supply). The type of omitted variables that might introduce biases in
our estimation results should have joint variation over airlines and city-pairs.
Using the estimated model, we have generated predictions for several statistics that describe
market structure. To obtain these predictions, for every observation in the sample (i.e., every
quarter-market-airline), we calculate CCPs using the estimated equilibrium probabilities evalu-
ated at the actual values of the observed state variables. Then, we use these choice probabilities
to generate, for each sample observation, a random draw of the decision variable. Finally, we use
these random draws to calculate the predicted statistics of market structure.27 Table 10 reports
predicted and actual values of the statistics. Overall, the estimated model performs reasonably
well. However, there are some significant biases in the predictions. The model over-predicts the
proportion of markets with 1 and 2 incumbents, and it under-predicts the proportion of markets
without incumbents. Interestingly, the model under-predicts the proportion of markets where
Southwest is a monopolist. In the estimated model, it is very clear that Southwest has lower
costs than any other airline, and that this feature makes it possible for Southwest to operate
with profits in markets where the rest of the airlines would have losses. However, the model fails
short to explain part of Southwest monopoly power. Finally, the model fits reasonably well the
27These predicted statistics contain a simulation error. However, for the statistics that we report here, which
are averages over 1,485 markets, 3 quarters, and 22 airlines, this simulation error is very small even if we use
just one simulation per observation. Given that the statistics are sample means, and that the simulation error
is independently distribution across observations and it is averaged over a large number of observations, we have
that the bias introduced by the simulation error is very small.
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distributions of the number of exits and entries, with just a small over-prediction of the amount
of market turnover.
5 Disentangling demand, cost and strategic factors
We use our estimated model to measure the contribution of demand, cost and strategic factors to
explain airlines’ propensity to operate using hub-and-spoke networks. We analyze how diﬀerent
parameters of the model contribute to explain the observed hub-and-spoke ratios. The parameters
of interest are the ones that measure the eﬀects of hub-size on demand (α2 and α3), variable
costs (δ2 and δ3), fixed costs (γFC2 ), and entry costs (ηEC2 ). We implement four experiments.
In experiment 1, we consider a counterfactual model with zero hub-size eﬀects on demand and
variable costs, i.e., α2 = α3 = δ2 = δ3 = 0. In experiment 2, the counterfactual model has zero
hub-size eﬀects on fixed costs, i.e., γFC2 = 0. In experiment 3, we fix the hub-size eﬀects on entry
costs at zero, i.e., ηEC2 = 0. Finally, in experiment 4 we want to measure the contribution of entry
deterrence motive. We consider a counterfactual model where the local manager of a city-pair
AB is only concerned with profits from non-stop routes AB and BA but not with profits from
other (one-stop) routes that contain AB or BA as a segment. Under this counterfactual, local
managers do not internalize the complementarity between profits at diﬀerent local markets, and
therefore there is not the entry deterrence motive that we consider in this paper.
Multiplicity of equilibria is an important problem when we use the estimated model to predict
players’ behavior in counterfactual scenarios such as a change in structural parameters. Here
we propose an approach to deal with this problem. The main advantages of this approach are
its simplicity and its minimum assumptions on the equilibrium selection mechanism. The main
limitation is that it provides only a first order approximation. This approximation might be
imprecise when the counterfactual structural parameters are far from the estimated values. We
propose and implement a second method that tries to alleviate this limitation.
An equilibrium associated with θ is a vector of choice probabilities P that solves the fixed
point problem P = Λ
¡
z˜Pθ + e˜P
¢
. For a given value θ, the model may have multiple equilibria.
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The model can be completed with an equilibrium selection mechanism. This mechanism can be
represented as a function that, for given θ, selects one equilibrium within the set of equilibria
associated with θ. We use π(θ) to represent this (unique) selected equilibrium. Our approach
here is agnostic with respect to the equilibrium selection mechanism. We assume that there is
such a mechanism, and that it is a smooth function of θ. But we do not specify any particular
form for the equilibrium selection mechanism π(.). Let θ0 be the true value of θ in the population
under study. Suppose that the data come from a unique equilibrium associated with θ0. Let P0
be the equilibrium in the population. By definition, P0 is such that P0 = Λ
¡
z˜P0θ0 + e˜P0
¢
and
P0 = π(θ0). Let (θˆ, Pˆ) be a consistent estimator of (θ0,P0).28 Let θ∗ be the vector of parameters
under a counterfactual scenario. We want to obtain airlines’ behavior and equilibrium outcomes
under θ∗. That is, we want to know the counterfactual equilibrium π(θ∗). The key issue to
implement this experiment is that given θ∗ the model has multiple equilibria, and we do not
know the function π. Given our model assumptions, the mapping Λ
¡
z˜Pθ + e˜P
¢
is continuously
diﬀerentiable in (θ,P). Our approach requires also the following assumption.
ASSUMPTION PRED: The equilibrium selection mechanism π(θ) is a continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function of θ around θˆ0.
Under this assumption, we can use a first order Taylor expansion to obtain an approximation
to the counterfactual choice probabilities π(θ∗) around our estimator θˆ0. An intuitive inter-
pretation of our approach is that we select the counterfactual equilibrium that is "closer" (in
a Taylor-approximation sense) to the equilibrium estimated in the data. The data is not only
useful to identify the equilibrium in the population but also to identify the equilibrium in the
counterfactual experiments. We do not know the function π and, apparently, we do not know the
Jacobian matrix ∂π(θˆ)/∂θ0 that is necessary to implement the Taylor approximation. However,
we show here that the equilibrium condition can be used to obtain this Jacobian matrix. A
28Note that we do not know the function π(θ). All what we know is that the point (θˆ, Pˆ) belongs to the graph
of this function π.
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Taylor approximation to π(θ∗) around θˆ implies that:
π(θ∗) = π(θˆ) + ∂π(θˆ)
∂θ0 (θ
∗ − θˆ) +O(k θ∗ − θˆ2 k) (25)
Note that π(θˆ) = Pˆ and that π(θˆ) = Λ(z˜π(θˆ)θˆ + e˜π(θˆ)). Diﬀerentiating this last expression
with respect to θ and solving for ∂π(θˆ)/∂θ0, we can represent this Jacobian matrix in terms of
Jacobians of Λ
¡
z˜Pθ + e˜P
¢
evaluated at the estimated values (θˆ, Pˆ). That is,
∂π(θˆ)
∂θ0 =
Ã
I − ∂Λ(z˜
Pˆθˆ + e˜Pˆ)
∂P0
!−1
∂Λ(z˜Pˆθˆ + e˜Pˆ)
∂θ0 (26)
Solving expression (26) into (25), we have that:
π(θ∗) = Pˆ+
Ã
I − ∂Λ(z˜
Pˆθˆ + e˜Pˆ)
∂P0
!−1
∂Λ(z˜Pˆθˆ0 + e˜Pˆ)
∂θ0 (θ
∗ − θˆ) +O(k θ∗ − θˆ k2) (27)
Therefore, under the condition that k θ∗ − θˆ k2 is small, the expression Pˆ + (I − ∂Λ(z˜Pˆθˆ +
e˜Pˆ)/∂P0)−1 ∂Λ(z˜Pˆθˆ + e˜Pˆ)/∂θ0 (θ∗ − θˆ) provides a good approximation to the counterfactual
equilibrium π(θ∗). Note that all the elements in this expression are known to the researcher.
In our application, this approach suﬀers of two limitations. The first limitation is computa-
tional. The dimension of the Jacobian matrix ∂Λ/∂P0 is NM |W |×NM |W |, that in our applica-
tion is equal to 130, 244, 400×130, 244, 400. Calculating all the elements of this matrix, and then
inverting the matrix I−∂Λ/∂P0 would be extremely costly. To deal with this problem we consider
a Taylor approximation on a player-by-player basis such that, for every local manager, we ap-
proximate the |W |×1 vector πim(θ∗) using the expression Pˆim+(I|W |−∂Λ(z˜Pˆimθˆ+ e˜Pˆim)/∂P0im)−1
∂Λ(z˜Pˆimθˆ+ e˜Pˆim)/∂θ0 (θ∗− θˆ). In our model, it is possible to show that this expression is equal to
Pˆim+ Pˆim ∗ (1− Pˆim) ∗ (z˜Pˆim(θ∗− θˆ)), where ∗ is the Hadamard or element-by-element product,
and 1 is a column vector of ones.29 A second important issue is the accuracy of the Taylor approx-
imation. Our counterfactual experiments are far from being marginal changes in the parameters.
Therefore, the approximation error might be large. To deal with this issue, we implement a
29To obtain this expression, first note that Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, p. 1526) implies
that in equilibrium the Jacobian matrix ∂Λ(z˜Pˆimθˆ + e˜Pˆim)/∂P0im is zero. Second, for the logistic function Λ, we
have that ∂Λ(z˜Pˆimθˆ + e˜Pˆim)/∂θ
0 is equal to Pˆim ∗ (1− Pˆim) ∗ z˜Pˆim.
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second method. Suppose that the Taylor approximation is precise enough to be in the dominion
of attraction of the counterfactual equilibrium π(θ∗). This means that if we start with the Taylor
approximation and then iterate in the equilibrium mapping, i.e., Pk+1 = Λ(z˜Pkθ∗ + e˜Pk), upon
convergence, we will obtain the counterfactual equilibrium π(θ∗). This is our second method for
the counterfactual experiments.30
Table 11 presents the results of our counterfactual experiments. The top panel shows the
results using the Taylor approximation approach, and the bottom panel reports the results the
second method. Though there are significant diﬀerences in the magnitudes of the hub-and-
spoke ratios, the two methods provide very similar pictures of the main qualitative implications.
Hub-size eﬀects on variable profits and fixed costs explain only a small portion of the observed
hub-and-spoke ratios. However, hub-size eﬀects on entry costs explain a very significant portion.
Based on our estimates in Table 10, hub-size generates cost-savings in entry costs that are
roughly equal to seven quarters of the cost-savings in fixed costs. Therefore, if airlines entering
in a city-pair stayed operating in that market for at least seven quarters, hub-size eﬀects on fixed
costs would have more important eﬀects on airlines’ behavior than the eﬀects on entry costs.
There are at least two reasons why that is not the case here. First, there are non-negligible
exit probabilities for most airlines and markets. The average probability of exit during the first
quarter of operation in a city-pair is approximately 10%. This implies a significant discount rate
on future fixed costs. Second, this discounting is much larger for those airlines that have large
hub sizes in the market. These airlines have lower entry costs and therefore larger entry and
exit rates. The larger probability of exit implies that they apply large discount rates on future
profits.
The entry deterrence motive plays an important role for Northwest and Delta. Interest-
ingly, Northwest and Delta are the airlines that, after Southwest, operate in a larger number of
monopoly markets (see Table 4) and that have largest hub sizes (see panel 5.3 in Table 5). In-
terestingly, Southwest is by far the airline with the smallest contribution of the entry deterrence
30Note that the policy iterations Pk+1 = Λ(z˜Pkθ∗+ e˜Pk) require to recalculate the transition probabilities fw,Pim
using the method that we describe in the Appendix.
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motive. This explains the empirical facts reported in Table 5.3 and Table 11 showing that the
monopoly markets occupied by the Northwest and Delta are more likely connected to their hubs
whereas those monopolized by Southwest tend to be isolated markets.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed and estimated a dynamic game of network competition in the US airline
industry. An attractive feature of the model is that an equilibrium of the model is relatively
simple to compute, and the estimated model can be used to analyze the eﬀects of alternative
policies. As it is common in dynamic games, the model has multiple equilibria and this is an
important issue when using the model to make predictions. We have proposed and implemented
a simple approach to deal with multiplicity of equilibria when using this type of model to predict
the eﬀects of counterfactual experiments.
We use this model and methods to study the contribution of demand, costs, and strategic
factors to the adoption of hub-and-spoke networks by companies in the US airline industry.
Though the scale of operation of an airline in an airport has statistically significant eﬀects on
variable profits and fixed operating costs, these eﬀects seem to play a minor role to explain
airlines’ propensity to adopt hub-and-spoke networks. In contrast, our estimates of the eﬀects
of hub-size on entry costs are very substantial. While airlines without previous presence in
an airport have to pay very significant entry costs to start their operation (i.e., around half a
million dollars, according to our estimates), an airline with a large hub in the airport has to
pay a negligible entry cost to operate an additional route. Eliminating these hub-size eﬀects
on entry costs reduces very importantly airlines propensity to adopt hub-and-spoke networks.
In our model, these cost savings can be interpreted either as due to technological factors or to
contractual agreements between airports and airlines. Investigating the specific sources of these
cost savings is an important topic for further research. For some of the larger carriers, we also
find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that a hub-and-spoke network can be an eﬀective
strategy to deter the entry of competitors in spoke markets.
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APPENDIX. Random-GridMethod to Approximate the Transition Probability Func-
tions fw,Pim .
We draw S independent random draws from the ergodic distribution of the vector wt. We use
these random draws to construct a simulator (i.e., approximation) of the transition probability
functions fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt). This simulator is consistent in the sense that it converges
to the true transition probability as S goes to infinity. The procedure to compute this simu-
lator can be described in four steps: (a) construction of the random-grids W (S)all and A
(S); (b)
simulator of the conditional probability functions Pr(w−imt|wimt,P); (c) simulator of the prob-
ability functions QPim(a−(im)t|wimt); and (d) simulator of the transition probability functions
fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt).
(a) Random Draws from the Ergodic Distribution of {wt}. We generate S independent random
draws from the ergodic distribution p∗(wt|P). Each draw is generated as follows. We start with
an arbitrary value of (x, z), say (x0, z0), and use the first order Markov structure of {xt, zt} to
generate a T -periods history starting from (x0, z0). For T large enough, the last period of this
history, (xT , zT ), provides a random draw from the ergodic distribution of (x, z) associated with
P. Then, we apply the functions wim(.) to obtain wimT = wim(xT , zT ) for every (i,m). The
following is a more detailed description:
(i) Given (x0, z0), we obtain wim0 = wim(x0, z0) for every local-manager (i,m).
(ii) We generate a random draw of next period vector x1. That is, for every local-
manager (i,m), we generate a random draw of next-period incumbent status using
the formula xim1 = 1{u ≤ Pim(wim0)}, where u is a random draw from a U(0, 1)
distribution.
(iii) We generate a random draw of next period vector z1. We use the (normal)
density functions pξ and pω to generate random draws of demand and cost shocks.
(iv) Given (x1, z1), we apply again (i)-(iii) to generate (x2, z2), and so on T times
until we generate (xT , zT ) and wT .
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We use W (S)all to denote the set of random draws from the ergodic distribution p
∗(wt|P). We
index the elements of this set by s, such that W (S)all = {w(s) : s = 1, 2, ..., S}. Since the lagged
action aimt−1 is a component of the vector wimt, the set of random draws defines also a grid in
the space of players’ actions, {0, 1}NM . We use A(S) to denote this random-grid in the action
space. In our estimations and numerical experiments, we have used T = 50 and S = 200, 000.
(b) Simulator of the conditional probability function Pr(w−im|wim,P). By definition, Pr(w−(im)
| wim,P) = p∗(wim,w−(im)|P)/p∗im(wim|P), where p∗(w|P) and p∗im(wim|P) are the ergodic
distributions of {wt} and {wimt}, respectively, under the strategies in P. Based on the random
draws inW (S)all , we can construct the following frequency simulators of these ergodic distributions:
p(S)∗(w|P) = S−1PSs=1 1{w = w(s)}, and p(S)∗im (wim|P) = S−1PSs=1 1{wim = w(s)im}. Therefore,
our frequency simulator of Pr(w−(im)|wim,P) is:
Pr(S)(w−(im)|wim,P) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
PS
s=1 1{(w−(im),wim) = w(s)}PS
s=1 1{wim = w(s)im}
if (w−(im),wim) ∈W (S)all
0 if (w−(im),wim) /∈W (S)all
Note that, Pr(S)(w−(im)|wim,P) is a well-defined conditional probability function that sums to 1
when ’integrated’ over all the values of w−(im) in the random-grid W
(S)
all .
(c) Simulator of the probability functions QPim(a−(im)|wim). In section 2.4, we have defined the
probability functions QPim as:
QPim(a−(im)|wim) ≡
P
w−(im)
" Q
(j,n)6=(i,m)
Pjn(wjn)ajn(1− Pjn(wjn))1−ajn
#
Pr(w−(im)|wim,P)
To obtain a consistent simulator of QPim, we just replace Pr(w−(im)|wim,P) by the simulator
Pr(S)(w−(im)|wim,P) defined in (b). That is, our simulator of QPim is:
Q(S)Pim (a−(im)|wim) =
P
w−(im)
" Q
(j,n)6=(i,m)
Pjn(wjn)ajn(1− Pjn(wjn))1−ajn
# PS
s=1 1{(w−(im),wim) = w(s)}PS
s=1 1{wim = w(s)im}
=
SP
s=1
" Q
(j,n)6=(i,m)
Pjn(wjn)ajn(1− Pjn(wjn))1−ajn
#
1{wim = w(s)im}PS
s=1 1{wim = w(s)im}
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By replacing Pr(w−(im)|wimt,P)with Pr(S)(w−(im)|wimt,P) we are also replacing the sum
P
w−(im)
by the sum
PS
s=1 over the random-grid W
(S)
all . This is because Pr
(S)(w−(im)t|wimt,P) has proba-
bility mass only at points in the random-grid.
The simulator Q(S)Pim is a probability distribution with probability mass at every point in the
action space of a−(im), i.e., over the whole set {0, 1}NM−1. To obtain our simulator of fw,Pim below,
it is convenient to have a simulator of QPim that has positive probability mass only at values of
a−(im) that belong to the random-grid in the action space, A(S). Therefore, we use the following
re-weighted simulator of QPim (see Rust, 1997):
Q˜(S)Pim (a−(im)|wim) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
Q(S)Pim (a−(im)|wim)PS
s=1Q
(S)P
im (a
(s)
−(im)|wim)
if a−(im) ∈ A(S)−(im)
0 if a−(im) /∈ A(S)−(im)
where a(s)−(im) represents the value of a−(im) for the s-th element in the random-grid A
(S).
(d) Simulator of the probability functions fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt). In section 2.4, we showed that
fw,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt) ≡
P
a−(im)
gwim(wimt+1|aimt,a−(im))QPim(a−(im)|wimt), where gwim(wimt+1|at) ≡P
zt+1∈Z 1{wimt+1 = wim(at, zt+1)} pz(zt+1). To obtain a consistent simulator of fw,Pim , we replace
QPim by the simulator Q˜
(S)P
im defined in (c), and replace g
w
im by the frequency simulator:
g(S)wim (wimt+1|at) =
1
S
PS
s=1 1
©
wimt+1 = wim(at, z(s))
ª
where {z(s) : s = 1, 2, ..., S} are the values of z associated with the random-gridW (S)all . Therefore,
our simulator of fw,Pim is:
f (S)w,Pim (wimt+1|aimt,wimt) =
P
a−(im)
g(S)wim (wimt+1|aimt,a−(im)) Q˜(S)Pim (a−(im)|wimt)
=
SP
s=1
g(S)wim (wimt+1|aimt,a(s)−(im)) Q˜(S)Pim (a(s)−(im)|wimt)
Since Q˜(S)Pim has positive probability mass only at points in the random-grid, replacing Q
P
im with
Q˜(S)Pim implies that we are also replacing the sum
P
a−(im)
by the sum
PS
s=1 over the random-grid
W (S)all .
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Table 1
Cities, Airports and Population
City, State Airports City Pop. City, State Airports City Pop.
New York-Newark-Jersey LGA, JFK, EWR 8,623,609 Las Vegas, NV LAS 534,847
Los Angeles, CA LAX, BUR 3,845,541 Portland, OR PDX 533,492
Chicago, IL ORD, MDW 2,862,244 Oklahoma City, OK OKC 528,042
Dallas, TX(1) DAL, DFW 2,418,608 Tucson, AZ TUS 512,023
Phoenix-Tempe-Mesa, AZ PHX 2,091,086 Albuquerque, NM ABQ 484,246
Houston, TX HOU, IAH, EFD 2,012,626 Long Beach, CA LGB 475,782
Philadelphia, PA PHL 1,470,151 New Orleans, LA MSY 462,269
San Diego, CA SAN 1,263,756 Cleveland, OH CLE 458,684
San Antonio,TX SAT 1,236,249 Sacramento, CA SMF 454,330
San Jose, CA SJC 904,522 Kansas City, MO MCI 444,387
Detroit, MI DTW 900,198 Atlanta, GA ATL 419,122
Denver-Aurora, CO DEN 848,678 Omaha, NE OMA 409,416
Indianapolis, IN IND 784,242 Oakland, CA OAK 397,976
Jacksonville, FL JAX 777,704 Tulsa, OK TUL 383,764
San Francisco, CA SFO 744,230 Miami, FL MIA 379,724
Columbus, OH CMH 730,008 Colorado Spr, CO COS 369,363
Austin, TX AUS 681,804 Wichita, KS ICT 353,823
Memphis, TN MEM 671,929 St Louis, MO STL 343,279
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN MSP 650,906 Santa Ana, CA SNA 342,715
Baltimore, MD BWI 636,251 Raleigh-Durham, NC RDU 326,653
Charlotte, NC CLT 594,359 Pittsburg, PA PIT 322,450
El Paso, TX ELP 592,099 Tampa, FL TPA 321,772
Milwaukee, WI MKE 583,624 Cincinnati, OH CVG 314,154
Seattle, WA SEA 571,480 Ontario, CA ONT 288,384
Boston, MA BOS 569,165 Buﬀalo, NY BUF 282,864
Louisville, KY SDF 556,332 Lexington, KY LEX 266,358
Washington, DC DCA, IAD 553,523 Norfolk, VA ORF 236,587
Nashville, TN BNA 546,719
Note (1): Dallas-Arlington-Fort Worth-Plano, TX
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Table 2
Ranking of City-Pairs by Number of Passengers
(Round-trip, Non-Stop) in 2004
CITY PAIR Total
1. Chicago New York 1,412,670
2. Los Angeles New York 1,124,690
3. Atlanta New York 1,100,530
4. Los Angeles Oakland 1,080,100
5. Las Vegas Los Angeles 1,030,170
6. Chicago Las Vegas 909,270
7. Las Vegas New York 806,230
8. Chicago Los Angeles 786,300
9. Dallas Houston 779,330
10. New York San Francisco 729,680
11. Boston New York 720,460
12. New York Tampa 713,380
13. Chicago Phoenix 706,950
14. New York Washington 680,580
15. Los Angeles Phoenix 648,510
16. Miami New York 637,850
17. Los Angeles Sacramento 575,520
18. Atlanta Chicago 570,500
19. Los Angeles San Jose 556,850
20. Dallas New York 555,420
Source: DB1B Database
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Table 3
Airlines
Ranking by #Passengers and #City-Pairs in 2004
Airline (Code) #Passengers(1) #City-Pairs(2)
(in thousands) (maximum = 1,485)
1. Southwest (WN) 25,026 373
2. American (AA)(3) 20,064 233
3. United (UA)(4) 15,851 199
4. Delta (DL)(5) 14,402 198
5. Continental (CO)(6) 10,084 142
6. Northwest (NW)(7) 9,517 183
7. US Airways (US) 7,515 150
8. America West (HP)(8) 6,745 113
9. Alaska (AS) 3,886 32
10. ATA (TZ) 2,608 33
11. JetBlue (B6) 2,458 22
12. Frontier (F9) 2,220 48
13. AirTran (FL) 2,090 35
14. Mesa (YV)(9) 1,554 88
15. Midwest (YX) 1,081 33
16. Trans States (AX) 541 29
17. Reno Air (QX) 528 15
18. Spirit (NK) 498 9
19. Sun Country (SY) 366 11
20. PSA (16) 84 27
21. Ryan International (RD) 78 2
22. Allegiant (G4) 67 3
Note (1): Annual number of passengers in 2004 for our selected markets
Note (2): An airline is active in a city-pair if it has at least
20 passengers/week in non-stop flights. This column refers to 2004-Q4.
Note (3): American (AA) + American Eagle (MQ) + Executive (OW)
Note (4): United (UA) + Air Wisconsin (ZW)
Note (5): Delta (DL) + Comair (OH) +Atlantic Southwest (EV)
Note (6): Continental (CO) + Expressjet (RU)
Note (7): Northwest (NW) + Mesaba (XJ)
Note (8): On 2005, America West merged with US Airways.
Note (9): Mesa (YV) + Freedom (F8)
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Table 4
Airlines, their Hubs, and Hub-Ratios
Airline (Code) Name and Hub Size Hub-Spoke Name and Hub Size Hub-Spoke
1st largest hub(1) Ratio (%) 2nd largest hub(1) Ratio (%)
One Hub Two Hubs
1. Southwest (WN) Las Vegas (35) 9.3 Phoenix (33) 18.2
2. American (AA) Dallas (52) 22.3 Chicago (46) 42.0
3. United (UA) Chicago (50) 25.1 Denver (41) 45.7
4. Delta (DL) Atlanta (53) 26.7 Cincinnati (42) 48.0
5. Continental (CO) Houston (52) 36.6 New York (45) 68.3
6. Northwest (NW) Minneapolis (47) 25.6 Detroit (43) 49.2
7. US Airways (US) Charlotte (35) 23.3 Philadelphia (33) 45.3
8. America West (HP) Phoenix (40) 35.4 Las Vegas (28) 60.2
9. Alaska (AS) Seattle (18) 56.2 Portland (10) 87.5
10. ATA (TZ) Chicago (16) 48.4 Indianapolis (6) 66.6
11. JetBlue (B6) New York (13) 59.0 Long Beach (4) 77.3
12. Frontier (F9) Denver (27) 56.2 Los Angeles (5) 66.6
13. AirTran (FL) Atlanta (24) 68.5 Dallas (4) 80.0
14. Mesa (YV) Phoenix (19) 21.6 Washington DC (14) 37.5
15. Midwest (YX) Milwakee (24) 72.7 Kansas City (7) 93.9
16. Trans States (AX) St Louis (18) 62.0 Pittsburgh (7) 93.9
17. Reno Air (QX) Portland (8) 53.3 Denver (7) 100.0
18. Spirit (NK) Detroit (5) 55.5 Chicago (2) 77.7
19. Sun Country (SY) Minneapolis (11) 100.0 (0) 100.0
20. PSA (16) Charlotte (8) 29.6 Philadelphia (5) 48.1
21. Ryan Intl. (RD) Atlanta (2) 100.0 (0) 100.0
22. Allegiant (G4) Las Vegas (3) 100.0 (0) 100.0
(1) The hub-size of the 1st largest hub is equal to the number of direct connections of the airline
from that airport. The hub-size of the 2nd largest hub is the number of direct connections of the
airline from that airport, excluding the connection to the lst largest hub.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics of Market Structure
1,485 city-pairs (markets). Period 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
2004-Q1 2004-Q2 2004-Q3 2004-Q4 All Quarters
(5.1) Distribution of Markets by Number of Incumbents
Markets with 0 airlines 35.79% 35.12% 35.72% 35.12% 35.44%
Markets with 1 airline 30.11% 29.09% 28.76% 28.28% 29.06%
Markets with 2 airlines 17.46% 16.71% 17.52% 18.06% 17.44%
Markets with 3 airlines 9.20% 10.83% 9.47% 9.88% 9.84%
Markets with 4 or more airlines 7.43% 8.25% 8.53% 8.67% 8.22%
(5.2) Herfindahl Index
Herfindahl Index (median) 5344 5386 5286 5317 5338
(5.3) Number of Monopoly Markets by Airline
Southwest 146 153 149 157
Northwest 65 63 67 69
Delta 58 57 57 56
American 31 34 33 28
Continental 31 26 28 24
United 21 14 13 17
(5.4) Distribution of Markets by Number of New Entrants
Markets with 0 Entrants - 82.61% 86.60% 84.78% 84.66%
Markets with 1 Entrant - 14.48% 12.31% 13.33% 13.37%
Markets with 2 Entrants - 2.44% 0.95% 1.69% 1.69%
Markets with 3 Entrants - 0.47% 0.14% 0.20% 0.27%
(5.5) Distribution of Markets by Number of Exits
Markets with 0 Exits - 87.89% 85.12% 86.54% 86.51%
Markets with 1 Exit - 10.55% 13.13% 11.77% 11.82%
Markets with 2 Exits - 1.35% 1.56% 1.15% 1.35%
Markets with more 3 or 4 Exits - 0.21% 0.21% 0.54% 0.32%
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Table 6
Transition Probability of Market Structure (Quarter 2 to 3)
# Firms in Q3
# Firms in Q2 0 1 2 3 4 >4 Total
0 93.83% 5.78% 0.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
519
1 9.07% 79.53% 11.16% 0.23% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00%
430
2 0.81% 19.84% 68.42% 10.12% 0.81% 0.00% 100.00%
247
3 0.20% 3.76% 20.20% 52.28% 19.21% 4.36% 100.00%
160
4 0.00% 1.59% 6.35% 31.75% 46.03% 14.29% 100.00%
63
>4 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.08% 33.90% 61.02% 100.00%
59
Total 528 425 259 140 73 53 1,478
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Table 7
Demand Estimation(1)
Data: 85,497 observations. 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
OLS IV
FARE (in $100)
³
− 1σ1
´
-0.329 (0.085) -1.366 (0.110)
ln(s∗)
³
1− σ2σ1
´
0.488 (0.093) 0.634 (0.115)
NON-STOP DUMMY 1.217 (0.058) 2.080 (0.084)
HUBSIZE-ORIGIN (in million people) 0.032 (0.005) 0.027 (0.006)
HUBSIZE-DESTINATION (in million people) 0.041 (0.005) 0.036 (0.006)
DISTANCE 0.098 (0.011) 0.228 (0.017)
σ1 (in $100) 3.039 (0.785) 0.732 (0.059)
σ2 (in $100) 1.557 (0.460) 0.268 (0.034)
Test of Residuals Serial Correlation
m1∼ N(0, 1) (p-value) 0.303 (0.762) 0.510 (0.610)
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, origin-airport dummies × time dummies,
and destination-airport dummies × time dummies. Stadard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8
Marginal Cost Estimation(1)
Data: 85,497 observations. 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
Dep. Variable: Marginal Cost in $100
Estimate (Std. Error)
NON-STOP DUMMY 0.006 (0.010)
HUBSIZE-ORIGIN (in million people) -0.023 (0.009)
HUBSIZE-DESTINATION (in million people) -0.016 (0.009)
DISTANCE 5.355 (0.015)
Test of Residuals Serial Correlation
m1∼ N(0, 1) (p-value) 0.761 (0.446)
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, origin-airport dummies × time dummies,
and destination-airport dummies × time dummies.
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Table 9
Estimation of Dynamic Game of Entry-Exit(1)
Data: 1,485 markets × 22 airlines × 3 quarters = 98,010 observations
Estimate (Std. Error)
(in thousand $)
Fixed Costs (quarterly):(2)
γFC1 + γFC2 mean hub-size +γFC3 mean distance 119.15 (5.233)
(average fixed cost)
γFC2 (hub-size in # cities connected) -1.02 (0.185)
γFC3 (distance, in thousand miles) 4.04 (0.317)
Entry Costs:
ηEC1 + ηEC2 mean hub-size +ηEC2 mean distance 249.56 (6.504)
(average entry cost)
ηEC2 (hub-size in # cities connected) -9.26 (0.140)
ηEC3 (distance, in thousand miles) 0.08 (0.068)
σε 8.402 (1.385)
β 0.99 (not estimated)
Pseudo R-square 0.231
(1) All the estimations include airline dummies, and city dummies.
(2) Mean hub size = 25.7 million people. Mean distance (nonstop flights) = 1996 miles
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Table 10
Comparison of Predicted and Actual Statistics of Market Structure
1,485 city-pairs (markets). Period 2004-Q1 to 2004-Q4
Actual Predicted
(Average All Quarters) (Average All Quarters)
Herfindahl Index (median) 5338 4955
Distribution of Markets Markets with 0 airlines 35.4% 29.3%
by Number of Incumbents " " 1 airline 29.1% 32.2%
" " 2 airlines 17.4% 24.2%
" " 3 airlines 9.8% 8.0%
" " ≥4 airlines 8.2% 6.2%
Number (%) of Monopoly Southwest 151 (43.4%) 149 (38.8%)
Markets for top 6 Airlines Northwest 66 (18.9%) 81 (21.1%)
Delta 57 (16.4%) 75 (19.5%)
American 31 (8.9%) 28 (7.3%)
Continental 27 (7.7%) 27 (7.0%)
United 16 (4.6%) 24 (6.2%)
Distribution of Markets Markets with 0 Entrants 84.7% 81.9%
by Number of New Entrants " " 1 Entrant 13.4% 16.3%
" " 2 Entrants 1.7% 1.6%
" " ≥3 Entrants 0.3% 0.0%
Distribution of Markets Markets with 0 Exits 86.5% 82.9%
by Number of Exits " " 1 Exit 11.8% 14.6%
" " 2 Exits 1.4% 1.4%
" " ≥3 Exits 0.3% 0.0%
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Table 11
Counterfactual Experiments
Hub-and-Spoke Ratios when Some Structural Parameters Become Zero
Method 1: Taylor Approximation
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects No complementarity
Carrier Observed in variable profits in fixed costs in entry costs across markets
Southwest 18.2 17.3 15.6 8.9 16.0
American 42.0 39.1 36.5 17.6 29.8
United 45.7 42.5 39.3 17.8 32.0
Delta 48.0 43.7 34.0 18.7 25.0
Continental 68.3 62.1 58.0 27.3 43.0
Northwest 49.2 44.3 36.9 18.7 26.6
US Airways 45.3 41.7 39.0 18.1 34.4
Method II: Policy Iterations Starting from Taylor Approx.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects No hub-size eﬀects No complementarity
Carrier Observed in variable profits in fixed costs in entry costs across markets
Southwest 18.2 16.9 14.4 8.3 16.5
American 42.0 37.6 34.2 16.6 24.5
United 45.7 40.5 37.3 15.7 30.3
Delta 48.0 41.1 32.4 17.9 22.1
Continental 68.3 60.2 57.4 26.0 42.8
Northwest 49.2 40.8 35.0 17.2 23.2
US Airways 45.3 39.7 37.1 16.4 35.2
Experiment 1: Counterfactual model: α2= α3= δ2= δ3= 0
Experiment 2: Counterfactual model: γFC2 = 0
Experiment 3: Counterfactual model: ηEC2 = 0
Experiment 4: Counterfactual model: Variable profit of local manager in city-pair AB ncludes only variable profits
from non-stop routes AB and BA.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Hub-and-Spoke Ratios
Figure 2: Histogram of the Logarithm of (Estimated) Variable Profits
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Figure 3: Histogram of Hub-Size (in million people)
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